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Introduction
Since the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States, the anthrax and white powder scares in many countries and with the Bali bombings, there has been increasing awareness of terrorist activity. These events, together with the recent war in Iraq and the current severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) epidemic 1, have highlighted the need at the national, state and individual hospital level for training and preparedness for emergency responses. Major incident plans must include contingencies to manage situations where caseload exceeds available resources, and require strong leadership, good communication and multi-disciplinary teamwork to provide efficient and effective patient care.
The Bali bombings caused much carnage in Kuta, which resulted in many casualty admissions for a number of Australian hospitals. The infection management service (IMS) at Royal Perth Hospital (RPH) played an important role in the coordinated emergency response, including a comprehensive infection control management response to the casualties.
At preliminary briefings, several key questions were critical to the development of our strategic plan. What multiresistant organisms (MROs) might these patients be carrying? How could we protect these patients from acquiring nosocomial infection? How might we prevent horizontal transmission of MROs in units where these patients were accommodated and elsewhere in the hospital? Finally, was bioterrorism a possibility? We were also cognisant of the necessity to consider carefully the on-going infection control needs of the rest of the hospital.
We believe it is timely to report our experiences and the lessons learnt from the RPH response to the bombings. Therefore, we report how the lMS collaborated with the RPH Bali Disaster Management Executive and implemented a comprehensive infection control response. Secondly, we report the subsequent nosocomial transmission of Bali MROs within RPH.
Background
On Saturday 12 October 2002 at 2300hrs, two bombs exploded within minutes of one another in the popular night spots of the Sari Club and Paddy's Bar in the Kuta district of Bali. Most casualties of the bombing were initially treated at Sanglah Hospital but, with more than 200 dead and 400 injured, the medical facilities and resources of the Sanglah Hospital were pushed well beyond available resources -and not just for the living 2. The limited mortuary facility at Sanglah Hospital, plus difficulties in the identification of badly charred and decomposing human remains, added to the enormity of the tragedy 2. Bali has limited medical resources, and significant political, cultural, religious and demographic differences from Australia.
Several Australian doctors were directly involved in management of patients at Sanglah Hospital 3. The' Australia Ward' at Sanglah Hospital was a large open ward with no airconditioning, but crowded with the general public and the media 3. Almost all patients had severe full-thickness burns (ranging from 25-85%). Many had shrapnel wounds or intraabdominal injuries, and some had blast-related limbthreatening vascular or crush injuries, and severe head or orthopaedic injuries 3. Problems encountered after the bombings included the language barrier, lack of adequate experienced medical staff, challenging triage decisions and insufficient resources e.g. shortage of beds, oxygen, intravenous fluids, anaesthetic and analgesic medication, blood, sterile gloves, scalpel blade handles and gowns' (Figure 1 ). For example, gloves had to be re-used after rudimentary cleaning and disinfection. Nevertheless, on the first day at Sanglah Hospital, many, if not all, patients were prescribed empirically one or more doses of intravenous cephalothin [Southwick Cl, Plastic Surgeon, Melbourne Institute of Plastic Surgery, Melbourne. Personal e-mail communication January 27 2003].
The Australian Defence Force (ADF) coordinated the evacuation of most patients, expatriating 66 critically ill patients from Bali to Royal Darwin Hospital (RDH) within 30 hours of the bombings4,'. Patients were stabilised, then under the direction of Emergency Management Australia, were transferred to various centres in Australia including RPH 5, '.
Major incident planning
The Western Australian (WA) State Emergency Management Committee met early on 13 October and a major incident plan was activated and coordinated from a command post in RPH. The command post facilitated communication between a Perth airport medical team, other Perth metropolitan hospitals and RPH. Regular metropolitan and internal RPH Bali Disaster Management Executive meetings were held to communicate developments and to share information.
The RPH burns unit (BU) has seven single bed rooms and one two bedded room with positive pressure ventilation. The RPH medical intensive care unit (ICU) has four Single bed negative pressure isolation rooms and an open ward area with eight beds. Thus patients admitted to lCU could not be cared for in positive pressure protective isolation rooms. The plastic surgery ward (PSW) had only four bedded bays and no single rooms.
RPH has the only adult BU for WA, and it was full prior to the bombings. Over 13-14 October the RPH Bali Disaster Management Executive moved all patients from the medical ICU and PSW to accommodate burnt patients from Bali. An extended BU area was developed, including the BU and ICU areas, with the PSW becoming the designated overflow burns ward for Bali patients. 
Initial infection control strategies
The infection control strategies were twofold. Firstly, to provide an environment to prevent infection in this highly susceptible group, and secondly to prevent the transmission of MROs to other patients. The IMS focused on the implementation of a multi-faceted infection control response.
Regular RPH Bali Disaster Management Executive meetings were held at 1700hrs to discuss issues ranging from surgical planning, staffing, supplies, infection control, customer and counselling services to media management. In addition to routine IMS meetings, ad hoc IMS meetings were held to deal with unexpected problems as they arose. Two members of the IMS attended all meetings of the RPH Bali Disaster Management Executive. Recommendations were taken to the RPH Bali Disaster Management Executive meeting for consideration and resolution of competing interests. Once the RPH Bali Disaster Management Executive endorsed agreed infection control strategies, then all parties actively implemented these infection control plans. These plans were regularly reviewed and modified as new laboratory data became available.
The IMS recommended cohorting of all Bali patients, where possible. In addition, ward access was further restricted, posters outlining required infection control practices were used and increased environmental hygiene, dedicated individual patient equipment, emphasis on cleaning and disinfection of patient care equipment, increased staff education and feedback, and monitoring of healthcare workers' (HCWs) adherence with infection control protocols were undertaken.
IMS initiatives included creation of a 'new front door' to the PSW, complete with keypad lock and intercom, to control PSW traffic. A four bedded bay was commandeered in the PSW to provide a comfortable waiting room -including television, coffee making facilities, vending machines and soft furnishings -for visitors and the media. Likewise, with cancellation of elective surgery, the day surgery ward adjacent to ICU was annexed to provide additional waiting room space. This helped reduce relatives' frustration and also limited ICU traffic.
Secondly, alcohol hand hygiene was introduced beyond preexisting areas of use (ICU and the BU) to include all areas with Bali patients.
Thirdly, the IMS maintained a high profile on all involved wards, with each area visited by a member of the IMS at least daily (often two to three times per day), to provide both up-tothe-minute information regarding laboratory results and to advise on patient care. Non-RPH volunteer HCWs and agency nurses were specifically targeted for additional support, education and feedback regarding infection control issues.
Regularly up-dated written management plans were also provided as an adjunct to verbal infection control instructions.
Finally, an outpatient dressing and physiotherapy clinic was specifically established for Bali patients to separate those outpatients who were colonised (or potentially colonised) with MROs from other burn patients.
The diagnostic microbiology laboratory response
There were significant laboratory resource implications, with a 20% increase in the number of wound swabs processed in October-November 2002. The greatest laboratory challenge was the rapid detection and susceptibility testing of MROs from diagnostic samples and screening swabs. In October-November the number of isolates requiring susceptibility testing doubled, and was more complex because of the wide range of MROs detected.
Burn wound surveillance swabs were collected regularly and the results used to guide empiric antimicrobial therapy when clinically indicated. MROs were isolated from clinical specimens, especially burn wounds. Most patients had many diagnostic samples as part of their routine management because of the severity of their injuries.
An endotracheal aspirate from one patient collected on 14 October yielded a Bacillus sp., and because of the patient's clinical condition and the possibility of bioterrorism, urgent exclusion of Bacillus anthracis (Le. inhalational anthrax) was required, but the isolate was identified as Bacillus cereus.
On 18 October the Communicable Diseases Network of Australia (CDNA) raised concerns about the possibility of unscreened Indonesian blood being given to expatriated Bali patients. Prompt serological screening for blood-borne viruses (BBVs) was performed, albeit with significant human and laboratory resource implications. Based on individual risk assessment and pre-test counselling, none of our patients were considered to require post-exposure prophylaxis for HIY. Prior to discharge, patients were given post-test counselling. Repeat serology for BBVs at 6 weeks and then 3 months after the incident was arranged at discharge.
Fresh (unrefrigerated) screened blood was used for all major burn surgery procedures at RPH. Aliquots of all warm ultrafresh blood were screened for bacterial contamination; this required significant microbiology laboratory resources. No samples yielded bacteria. MRPA was defined as resistance to three or more of the following antimicrobial classes: /S-lactam/ /S-lactamase inhibitor combinations (ticarcillin-clavulanic acid and/or piperacillin-tazobactam), aminoglycosides (gentamicin and/ or tobramycin and/or amikacin), ceftazidime, fourthgeneration cephalosporins (cefepime and/or cefpirome), quinolones (ciprofloxacin) and/or carbapenems (meropenem and/ or imipenem). Finally, concerns regarding adequate environmental cleaning, disinfection and hand hygiene were sporadically identified in the ICU. These problems were improved with the appointment of an infection control liaison nurse (see below), and a dedicated cleaning team. Clutter was also problematic, particularly in the ICU.
Screening procedures

Screening results
Clinical outcomes of Bali patients
The severely injured Bali burn patients were heavily colonised with multiple types of MROs. Colonisation with MROs resulted in eight episodes of bacteraemic sepsis in Bali patients ( Table 1 ).
• Two Bali patients died within the first week and another death occurred approximately 2 months after admission. Eight episodes of bacteraemia -caused by 12 organisms (including ten different MROs, one non-VRE E. faecium and one non-MRPA) -occurred in five Bali patients (Table 1 ).
Using the AICA definition 8, the EWMA control chart detected a significant rise in the hospital wide healthcare related bloodstream infection rates associated with the Bali patients (i.e. during October-November 2002 -data not shown). Bacteraemia were putatively associated with burn wound infections in most cases, as burn wound tissue biopsies and/ or swabs yielded the same organism concurrently in all cases. However, some patients also had urine and/or respiratory tract specimens yielding the same organism concomitantly. No bacteraemia was line-related.
The most significant organisms associated with bacteraemia were Pseudomonas species. Five episodes of Pseudomonas bacteraemia -caused by MRPA (three episodes), multiresistant Pseudomonas putida (one episode) and P. aeruginosa (one episode) -occurred in three Bali patients (Table 1 ). In two severely burned patients Pseudomonas bacteraemia (all with polymicrobial bacteraemia) contributed to their sepsis related deaths.
Empiric antimicrobial therapies for patients presumed to be infected with multiple MROs were difficult as few therapeutic options were available. Therefore, broadspectrum antibiotics (e.g. meropenem) were widely used empirically in the ICU.
The resultant evolution of carbapenem resistant Gram-negative bacilli required empiric Table 2 .
The first cluster was MRAB spread to three non-Bali patients which occurred in the PSW. Transient staff hand carriage was the presumed cause of nosocomial dissemination.
The second cluster occurred after the transfer of two known MRSA-positive Bali patients from an interstate hospital. This MRSA spread to a BD patient from Bali, and then, after the patient was transferred into a four bedded bay, to three other non-Bali room contacts in the PSW. Pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE) showed that all these isolates had identical clamped homogeneous electric field (CHEF) patterns (data not shown), supporting single-strain horizontal transmission.
The third and most significant cluster was MRPA transmission. A total of 29 non-Bali patients were colonised and/ or infected with MRPA. The last of the Bali patients was discharged from lCD on 9 December. Despite this, we continue to experience an ongoing problem of MRPA, with the lCD the recognised focal point. Sixteen lCU patients have been colonised and/or infected with MRPA; seven were local WA burns patients who were treated in the lCD.
Horizontal transmission of MRPA extended beyond the lCD and included the BD and the neurosurgical ward. Six BD patients who were never admitted to lCD have become colonised and/or infected with MRPA. An ICD patient with MRPA on ICD discharge screening swabs was transferred to the neurosurgical ward, and a further four additional cases of MRPA carriage and/or infection are also putatively linked. The index patient on the neurosurgical ward later died and MRPA ventriculitis and meningitis (associated with an external ventricular drain) contributed to his death.
In total, of the 41 non-Bali patients who became colonised with MROs, eight patients developed bacteraemia, seven patients with MRPA and one with an ESBL-producer, causing a total of 11 episodes of bacteraemia. In four non-Bali patients' MRPA, septicaemia contributed to their deaths.
PFGE typing of some MRPA isolates revealed three genotypically closely related clusters when using the Tenover criteria 9. All three clusters had Bali burn patients as presumed index cases, strongly suggesting horizontal transmission.
Additional infection control strategies following horizontal transmission of MROs to non-Bali patients
Additional infection control interventions were implemented in response to further horizontal transmission of MROs to non-Bali patients. A barrier previously used to separate the ICD isolation rooms from the rest of the ward was re-erected. A poster on the barrier alerted visitors and staff of the need to adhere to additional precautions.
An ICD infection control liaison nurse, with past IMS experience, was seconded to educate staff and enforce additional precautions in the isolation rooms and hand hygiene after every patient contact. The role included observation and auditing of environmental cleaning and disinfection to ensure adequate hygiene. Regular updates were provided to all staff to increase their awareness of the ongoing problem.
An outbreak investigation 10, 11 and review of practices associated with the use of water sources was undertaken. The draining of dialysate drainage bags into a sluice was considered sub-optimal-thus reuse of these bags was ceased. Extensive environmental sampling of known sources of hospital acquired P. aeruginosa sepsis 11 found one MRPA positive sink drain in the ICD clean stock room. Dedicated cleaning teams were employed to thoroughly clean the ICD weekly to reduce environmental contamination.
Discussion
Burn patients are among the patients at highest risk for hospital-acquired infections 12 • did not initially apply to the Bali patients. Potential explanations include the importance of pathogens such as MRAB in community and hospital acquired infections in the tropics 11>-18; immersion of some Bali patients in hotel pool water after injury; sub-optimal facilities for burns patients at Bali hospitals; administration of empiric cephalothin; and possibly the delay in performing early cleansing and debridement of heavily soiled burn wounds at RPH.
A. baumannii are ubiquitous organisms found in water and soil that readily acquire resistance to many antimicrobials. Environmental levels are increased during the summer months, possibly due to biofilm bloom in tapwater. Skin and mucous membrane carriage is higher in the tropics than in temperate climates. Community acquired A. baumannii pneumonia is well described in Darwin and in other tropical/sub-tropical climates 16. A. baumannii are also emerging nosocomial opportunists among debilitated patients, particularly in ICUs. Most hospital (and many community) isolates are multi-resistant. MRAB are recognised pathogens associated with trauma related wound infections (e.g. following missile injuries during the Iran-Iraq war 19) , and has been reported from infected wounds from the recent conflict in Iraq 20. Outbreaks of MRAB have been described in BUs 17,21. We had recurrent outbreaks of MRAB in RPH over the 5 year period 1992-1997 22 , but never involving the BU. We have seen only one sporadic case of MRAB bacteraemia in the RPH BU over the last 5 years.
In Bali patients, MRAB caused bacteraemia in three patients, and colonised and/or infected the burn wounds of 19 Bali patients; it also caused cross-transmission to eight non-Bali patients. Many isolates were initially resistant to all anti microbials apart from carbapenems and colisitin, but panresistant strains emerged (data not shown).
ESBL-producing Gram-negative bacteria are significant nosocomial pathogens 22 which are usually spread within hospitals by HCW hands. Klebsiellae in particular survive long periods on environmental surfaces ". Outbreaks of ESBL-producers have been described in BUs ", and we reported a small cluster of ESBL-producing Klebsiella pneumoniae related sepsis in the RPH BU in 1997 ". However, we had not seen EBSL-producers cause sepsis in the RPH BU from then until the Bali patients were admitted. Table 2 ). t P. aeruginosa bacteraemias due to MRPA (2 patients -3 episodes), non-multi-resistant P. aeruginosa (1 patient -1 episode) and P. putida (1 patient -1 episode) . L All MRSA isolates were multi-resistant strains that were identical by both phage typing and PFGE with analysis of CHEF patterns, outside hospitals is associated with water reservoirs, including swimming pools, and whirlpools 11, 12. Thus the history of exposure to swimming pool water in Bali may be significant. Risk factors for P aeruginosa infection are multifactorial, but infection is mostly frequently seen in the hospital setting, and burn patients are at very high risk of Pseudomonas sepsis 11 -13. In hospitals, respiratory equipment, clean solutions, medicines, disinfectants, sinks, mops and even food are important sources 1H3. In spite of strict infection control measures, epidemiological investigation and PFGE :J: P. aeruginosa bacteraemias due to MRPA in seven patients (9 episodes) . One non-Bali burns patient in fCU has also had a further episode of bacteraemia due to non-multi-resistant isolate ofP. aeruginosa (data not shown in Table 3 ).
ESBL-producers caused bacteraemia in two
typing of strains showed that nosocomial transmission occurred.
Most isolates of Pseudomonas sp. in Bali patients were initially relatively resistant to antimicrobials, and progressively became more resistant. Frequent use of empiric meropenem undoubtedly contributed to evolution of carbapenem resistant strains (usually colistin susceptible, but panresistant in some cases) (data not shown) -an emerging global resistance concern 26. Lessons learnt What lessons did the IMS learn from the RPH response to the Bali bombings and its aftermath, and what would we do differently with a large number of severely burnt patients from another disaster? What are our plans for the future?
Firstly, good leadership after a major incident is crucial ·. A key to good administration was the development of the RPH Bali Disaster Management Executive early to coordinate activities and provide information to all relevant departments. All departments acknowledged the benefit of this group and the leadership that emanated from it. The result was broad cooperation throughout the hospital, thereby providing efficient and effective patient care in what was a wellcoordinated hospital response to an extraordinary event.
Secondly, good communication after a major incident is crucial 6. This was achieved with the RPH Bali Disaster Management Executive. Communication between the ICU and our department has been further enhanced. The ICU n ATT MRSA isolates were multi-resistant strains that were identical by both phage typing and PFGE with analysis of CHEF patterns.
have seconded a clinical nurse to act as an infection control liaison nurse to continue to facilitate the implementation and monitoring of infection control practices. Consultants from both the ICU and our department have been nominated to undertake clinical liaison responsibilities, thus ensuring rapid communication of any infection control concerns or issues as they arise.
Thirdly, additional facilities to care for burn patients (and other patients requiring protective isolation) in RPH 12. 13 would have been helpful. Access to more burns rooms and the ability to maintain the Bali cohort as an isolated group may have prevented some subsequent transmission of MROs.
Prior to the Bali bombings, plans were being drafted to convert four beds in the open lCU area into four single bed rooms -all with positive pressure ventilation and HEPA filtered air and each with an anteroom. Air will be exhausted to make the anteroom air pressure negative with respect to both the isolation room and the ICU. Clutter in the ICU was another problem. Storage space for equipment necessary for large numbers of burn patients was inadequate. Renovations of the ICU in the latter half of 2003 will provide the four single rooms and more storage space.
Fourthly, environmental cleaning is crucial for the control of MROs 10-14 . In future incidents, cleaning teams will be assembled forthwith to ensure adequate cleaning is performed and monitored. In April 2003 single stream cleaning teams were introduced at RPH which should improve the overall standard of environmental cleaning in the wards. Fifthly, for a trial period, we have implemented routine screening of patients for multi-resistant Gram-negative bacilli when they are admitted from the tropics, especially southeast Asia.
Finally, improved antimicrobial stewardship may have helped limit the development and spread of MROs 27. Daily ward rounds of areas with Bali patients by a consultant from our department may have limited antimicrobial utilisation and, in some cases, provided more narrow-spectrum therapies. The appointment of an infectious diseases pharmacist, together with electronic antimicrobial approval and software support systems, was planned at RPH before the Bali disaster. A multi-disciplinary antimicrobial stewardship programme is currently being formed to establish this initiative. Surveillance of antimicrobial utilisation with control charts is also planned '".
In summary, the overall response from RPH staff to the Bali tragedy was exceptional. We implemented an infection control strategy that contributed to good outcomes for most Bali bombing patients. However, most Bali patients were colonised, and some became infected with one or more MROs. Finally, nosocomial transmission of MROs at RPH has been a legacy of the Bali tragedy.
Prod uct News
Allegiance -Australia and New Zealand I am proud to be part of the new Allegiance team in Australia and New Zealand; these two businesses join the growing number of Allegiance subsidiaries around the world.
The company has a broad product range of medical devices for operating room and other patient care areas and, of course, is the pioneer of Custom Sterile-and Pack Management services. This combination of medical products and services provides a unique approach to assisting you in the job of caring for your patients.
Allegiance is now part of the Cardinal Health group of companies. Cardinal Health is one the world's largest companies and the integration of these products and services guarantees an innovative future through' Operational excellenceby choosing the higher standard in everything we do.
Partnershipby achieving the best results from long-term collaboration with our customers.
Integrationthrough creation of unique solutions by linking our resources to address specific customer issues.
Innovationlooking beyond the obvious to find ways to apply our expertise for the benefit of our customers.
As we build the Allegiance identity in Australia and New Zealand, and as you come to associate our well known product brands with the Allegiance name, we will value the opportunity to demonstrate our capability. If you haven't yet used an Allegiance product or service, please call us and let us introduce our solutions to you.
John Brassil, General Manager Allegiance, Australia and New Zealand
Australian Infection Control 20. Peterson K. Multi-drug resistant (MDR) Acinetobacter in the Persian C uU. 
NEWGEN Br ACHIEVE
NewGen and Achieve are revolutionary instrument processing detergents developed to eHiciently clean instruments, containers and articles. in a range of mechanical washers.
~~----....I NewGen and Achieve may be used to clean the following instruments: 
